Why Day Zero Couldn't Happen!

See the amended version on The Conversation

When dealing with a complex crisis such as the Cape Town water situation, it is important to understand how proposed interventions would achieve the intended goals by using systems thinking. The world has zoomed its focus to Cape Town as the city faces an impending threat of “Day Zero” – albeit with shifting dates. Day Zero represents the point at which the municipality turns of water distribution system for much of the city except strategic and vulnerable areas. The big question is whether the measures in place to manage Day Zero on a day-to-day basis are robust or even feasible. The city has broadcast a disaster management strategy which includes establishing 200 water distribution points across the city, at which citizens can collect their 25 litre daily water allocation. This thought piece utilised system dynamics – a modelling approach - to simulate water collection in this manner over the course of a day (24 hours). Key assumptions were made: the population of Cape Town is estimated at 4 million people – 700 000 people who live in strategic areas or informal settlements will not have their taps turned off – 800 000 people within proximity of informal settlements will potentially source water there; 2 500 000 people will be required to collect water at designated water points; 200 distribution points are planned; an average of 50 taps per distribution site; water distributed is 25 litres per person – individuals are able to collect up to 100 litres a day to cover four day of consumption or share with other members of their household - this model assumes that the whole population must receive their allocation, but does not specify the hoarding or sharing behaviours which enable this; initial water pressure is assumed at a level which allows outflow of 10 litres per minute, which implies it requires 2.5 minutes to fill 25 litres or service one person; a waiting delay of half a minute (30 seconds) from changing between containers and people is assumed; equal distribution of people per water distribution point is assumed.

Insights and possible reactions
With the above assumptions, it would require 12.5 hours to provide water to the entire population per day, which can be cumbersome! Possible reactions to deal with the Day Zero water supply approach, illustrated in Figure 1, include: (i) doubling the number of distribution points (grey), which would require increasing the distribution points from 200 to 400, which will enable serving the population within 5 hours; (ii) changing water pressure to between 20 – 30 litres per minute (yellow), based on the population requiring to be serviced, which enables servicing the population within 8 hours; (iii) increasing the number of taps per distribution point to 75 or 100 per distribution point (blues), which would make it possible to service the population within 9 hours and 7 hours respectively. A combined scenario of 75 taps per site and increasing water pressure to 20 – 30 litres per minute, while maintaining the 200 sites (green), shows that the population are serviced much faster but within 6 hours. This appears more practical scenario, than doubling distribution points, with only one hour less time (5 hours) in servicing the population, in comparison with the combined scenario.

Figure 1_Population Serviced per Distribution Point Scenarios
Figure 1: Population Serviced per Distribution Point Scenarios

Socio-political dynamics of water crisis

Water crisis is a socio-political issue, and the insights discussed above could function perfectly as technical solutions. However, socio-political realities would quickly undermine these imagined, technical, plausible scenarios. For instance, how can the city ensure that people are taking the allocated amount of water? How would military order at a distribution point look in practice? What is the extent of conflict arising at the water points due to long queues and unmanaged behaviours, and how does this compromise the ability to service the people at a distribution point? To what extent can the water crisis contribute to some sort of social cohesion, given that water does not discriminate against anyone? How can water remain in the commons when those with means are able to develop private sources?

The aggregate impact of socio-political dynamics deviates from the well-organised technical solutions proposed above. They can be represented as random shocks, referred as ‘disruption noise’. This could dramatically increase the time required to service each person, implying that less people are serviced per hour (see Figure 2). It also means that, it will require 25 hours to service the population per distribution point, illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 2_Average Population Serviced per hour due to Disruption Noise
Figure 2: Average Population Serviced per hour due to Disruption Noise
Figure 3_Comparison of Population Serviced per Distribution in Base and Disruption Noise Scenarios
Figure 3: Comparison of Population Serviced per Distribution in Base and Disruption Noise Scenarios

A key insight of the scenarios suggests that should Day Zero occur, the best technical intervention with less time required to service the population, would be doubling the number of distribution points to 400. However, a combined scenario of increasing number of taps per distribution point and increasing water pressure, while keeping the distribution points at 200, would be more practical. Further, the reality of conflict and water collection delays would increase the amount of time needed to service the whole population. These delays are unpredictable and incalculable and are the greatest indication for why Day Zero cannot be allowed to happen. The disaster management plan is unfeasible and would struggle to service people timeously while managing conflict.

A shared responsibility to become water cognisant

Water crisis in the city of Cape Town is a shared responsibility which faces a ‘tragedy of Commons’ systems archetype. What this means is that individuals may act in self-interest (such as water hoarding or wasteful water activities) at the expense of society. The availability of water resource, which may prevent the occurrence of Day Zero, is dependent on everyone acting in water-conscious manners, and being cognisant of how day-to-day activities, contribute to water efficiency and water availability for all.

Cape Town has for a long time, focused and relied, on water demand management measures, with limited interventions on the supply side management. Lessons from the Cape Town water crisis for other cities include better planning by focusing on the root cause of problems and not their symptoms, identifying high leverage intervention points, and understanding how best to affect these interventions. We hope the efforts to record how the many actors in Cape Town have contributed to water demand reduction as well as supply augmentation, will be used when future interventions are needed.

The Cape Town water crisis has been a result of the patterns and trends that systemic structures generated. Further, the variety and diversity of our understanding of how the system works, means that various actors in society (e.g. households, government, business, and academics) perceived and interpreted the systemic structures differently, and therefore acted differently.

This is a lesson that the City should take on: by more actively understanding, characterising, measuring, and communicating its dynamic metabolic patterns, which include not only water, but also energy, food, and wastes. There are many groups in the city that can improve the sourcing, utilisation and efficiency of the resource systems on which the city relies. After all, you cannot manage what you cannot measure.



Enkanini Case Summary

Enkanini case description
Enkanini, which means to take by force, is an informal settlement, which was established in 2006 through the illegal occupation of municipal land (CORC, 2012). It is located approximately 4 km from the centre of Stellenbosch town. The settlement was created when the evicted backyard shack dwellers of the neighbouring Kayamandi township occupied the adjacent land (Kovacic et al., 2016). Enkanini may be classified as having started as a squatter camp (Category C: Informal, Illegal, Unplanned, Illegitimate), which is gradually progressing to a site and service informal settlement (Category D: Informal, Legal, Planned; Legitimate) with limited access to basic services (Smit et al., 2017).
Several research studies have been conducted in the Enkanini informal settlement. Such as, studies focusing on waste management (Von der Heyde, 2014), food waste and food production (Mollat, 2014), sustainable energy and in situ upgrading (Keller, 2012) and power transitions (Wessels, 2015). Wessels (2015) characterises the Enkanini informal settlement as an illegal, un-mobilised, underdeveloped, local community. Although these characterisations are valuable in understanding the complex nature of the community, they do not position the informal settlement as a socio-ecological system that is connected to the wider urban system, hence, necessitating an alternative approach. The imperative for sustainable, equitable urban planning requires a new understanding of informal settlements beyond their physical, geographical, and legal characteristics. Smit et al., (2017) argues that it requires a holistic understanding of the interconnectedness of these spaces with their broader urban environment, through a multi-scale integrated assessment of the societal and ecosystem metabolism (MuSIASEM) approach. The study is based on Suzanne Smit’s Ph.D. in which the Enkanini case study was carried out as part of the Participatory Integrated Assessment of Energy Systems to Promote Energy Access and Efficiency (PARTICIPIA) project.

The MuSIASEM approach is an analytical tool for analysing the development of human society in relation to sustainability, whilst being multi-disciplinary (Giampietro et al., 2001). It is capable of integrating variables related to non-equivalent descriptive domains and equipped to incorporate data from distinct hierarchical levels (Giampietro et al., 2001). The MuSIASEM approach, developed by Giampietro et al. (2012, 2013), is based on Georgescu-Roegen’s flow-fund model (Giampietro and Mayumi, 2000a; 2000b). Unlike other conventional urban metabolism approaches such as an economy-wide material flow analysis (Raupova et al., 2014; Kovanda, 2014), an ecological footprint analysis (Wang et al., 2014), and input-output analyses (Huang and Bohne, 2012), the MuSIASEM approach provides a characterisation of informal settlements at different levels and scales in terms of funds and flows and across multiple dimensions. Fund elements include: (i) human activity measured in time; (ii) exosomatic devices in the form of technology and infrastructures; and (iii) Ricardian land measured in terms of land use. Flows are represented by the elements metabolised in the system, which include: (i) food; (ii) energy; (iii) water; (iv) waste; and (v) money.

Data collection
This type of study had not been conducted in an informal settlement or African context before, and necessitated the design of a detailed data collection tool that would capture the necessary data whilst being context specific. The questionnaire was developed by Suzanne Smit, as part of her Ph.D. and with inputs from the research centre and community members, the tool was modified for the specific context and translated into English and isiXhosa (the language spoken by the majority of residents).

The questionnaire was designed to capture the following:
  • Demographic data – age and gender of individuals and household composition
  • Human activity - related to individuals’ time spent on paid and unpaid work; physiological overhead, leisure and social activities, education and time spent on travel.
  • Money flows – related to individual and household income and expenditure
  • Energy flows – related to the type of energy carriers used for different household activities (such as cooking, lighting, and heating), quantity of fuels used and associated costs.

The input from community members ensured that specific cultural references or practices were not overlooked. For example, the term ‘Stokvel’ (referring to a type of community-based saving scheme) was included as a possible source of income and savings instrument, while remittances (the practice of sending money to family in another region) were also captured.

The fieldwork for this study was conducted in collaboration with the Enkanini Research Centre who appointed three experienced, community members as co-researchers to administer the questionnaires to 100 households within the settlement. This arrangement would increase access to the community whilst improving community participation and input. Co-researchers also contributed to a participatory mapping exercise to indicate land use and infrastructure in Enkanini. Highlights included the location of churches, shebeens (informal restaurant establishments), educational facilities, spaza shops (micro businesses), and municipal supplied water, waste and sanitation facilities.

The following publications emanate from the Enkanini case:
  1. Kovacic Z, Smit S, Musango JK, Brent AC & Giampietro M. 2016. Probing uncertainty levels of electrification in informal urban settlements: A case from South Africa. Habitat International, 56: 212-221. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2016.06.002
  2. Smit, S, Musango, JK, Kovacic, Z & Brent, AC. 2017. Conceptualising slum in an urban African context. Cities, 62: 107 – 109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2016.12.018

Energy-Economy Nexus

In general, mainstream economists neglect the idea that high energy prices can cause economic decline or stagnation. It is frequently argued that energy costs are small compared to other expenditures that make up GDP (e.g. consumer spending, which makes up about 70%), which makes them insignificant (Aucott & Hall, 2014; Heun et al., 2017). This view ignores the importance of energy as a multiplier of economic growth and development (Yeager et al., 2012). Simply comparing the percentage accounted for by energy expenditures with other expenditures ignores the multiplier effect of energy and the effects of energy prices on the costs of production and hence products and services in the economy. If the price of energy increases, almost everything costs more, and this ripples through the economy.

Mainstream economic thinking has not identified energy as a primary factor of production (Aucott & Hall, 2014; Heun et al., 2017; Stern, 2011). Resource economists have developed models that incorporate the role of energy in the growth process, but these ideas remain isolated in the resource economics field (Stern, 2011). Ozturk (2009) conducted a survey on recent progress in the literature of the nexus and causality between energy consumption-economic growth, and electricity consumption-economic growth. This study revealed a lack of consensus on the existence and direction causality between energy consumption and economic growth. These conflicting results may arise due to different data sets, countries’ characteristics, variables used and different econometric methodologies have been used.

However, an important conclusion on the relationship between electricity consumption and economic growth for the country-specific studies were drawn; which is that the causality is from electricity consumption to economic growth. Consequently, it is found that electricity is a limiting factor to economic growth and, hence, reductions in electricity supply will have a negative impact on economic growth (Ozturk, 2009).

Aucott, M., & Hall, C. (2014). Does a change in price of fuel affect GDP growth? An examination of the U.S. data from 1950-2013. Energies, 7(10), 6558–6570. https://doi.org/10.3390/en7106558
Heun, M. K., Sakai, M., Santos, J., Brockway, P. E., Pruim, R., & Domingos, T. (2017). From Theory to Econometrics to Energy Policy : Cautionary Tales for Policymaking Using Aggregate PrHeun, Matthew K.oduction Functions. Energies. https://doi.org/10.3390/en10020203
Ozturk, I. (2009). A literature survey on energy-growth nexus. Energy Policy, 38(1), 340–349. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.09.024
Stern, D. I. (2011). The role of energy in economic growth. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1219(1), 26–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05921.x
Yeager, K., Dayo, F., Fisher, B., Fouquet, R., Gilau, A., & Rogner, H.-H. (2012). Energy and Economy. Global Energy Assessment - Toward a Sustainable Future, 385–422.

Cautionary Tales of Technology Leapfrogging

The late twentieth and early twenty-first century recorded enormous technological advancement that helped transform the global economic, political, social, and environmental landscape in a way quite exceeding the expectations of ardent development pundits. While these recorded improvements on the global socio-economic spectrum may yet be perceived as abysmal by others, the strides made are widely acknowledged across fields. The velocity of changes witnessed in the technological sphere has prompted researchers to surmise, that technology users who are late in adoption could easily afford to skip a whole generation or bundle of technologies since a more efficient and high-tech alternative to such conventional technology would have been in existence within a short period of time. The ability of these late adopters (using traditional technology) to skip a generation of technology (conventional technology) and leap to the very latest (emerging ultramodern technology) is often referred to as leapfrogging.

One fundamental feature of technology development and adoption is that it assumes an S-shape, depicting the key stages of introduction, growth, and maturation as shown in Figure 1 below. An S-shaped technological change implies that: either the development process is very slow to allow for a catch-up that is a non-revolutionary breakthrough, or is very fast to allow for the skipping of intermediate stages1. An individual, country, or entity able to achieve the technological changes described is deemed to have leapfrogged. The success of the emerging technology depends on many factors including the extent to which it differs from the present.

Figure 1: Technology development curve

The introduction of a new technology which provides the same services as a conventional one, but adds improved features such as expedience, portability, accessibility, suitability, affordability, among others is often touted as ideal for those who remained without access to the existing technology. The adoption of the new technology among those without the conventional one however does not usually develop as rapidly as the optimists forecast. A key reason for this disconnect between the Utopia that technology optimist imagined and the reality, is the omission of external social-cultural precepts that influence the consumers’ adoption decision-making process. In brief, peoples’ way of life does not instantly change with the introduction of a technology2 as they require significant time for realignment. Technologies do not also prescribe their own path or course of action but instead depend on the social context of individuals, institutions, and structures which they shape3.

The figure below is a depiction of leapfrogging using technologies in the energy sector. The old and near-absolute technology here is called the traditional (energy) technology, the present dominant one is referred to as the conventional (present energy) technology, and the modernistic or next generation, revolutionary (renewable energy) technology. Renewable energy leapfrogging in Africa is one of the growing research areas among recent academics. Following the global fight against climate change and progressive improvements in renewable energy technology development, many scholars are investigating the prospects of leapfrogging Africa, which largely characterised by unmet energy markets, to renewable energy technologies.
Pasted Graphic 1
Figure 2: Energy Technology Leapfrogging Framework

Figure 2 illustrates how Africa and other unmet energy markets could depart from their present traditional-based energy to renewable energy without going through the ‘dirty’ conventional fossil energy regime. Their ability to do that would be facilitated by the fact that they are not trapped in conventional energy infrastructures which often act as inertia.

Extant leapfrogging literature tend to focus largely on the technology, with limited consideration for the social-cultural environment. They assess the incentives the technology offers as well as the consumer’s ability to pay for it. One recent study surmised: “…..unlike the old infrastructure technologies such as fixed-line telephone systems, which were subjected to the budgetary pressures of governments as the main provider, new technologies such as the Internet and mobile phones are delivered within the regulatory framework that fosters market competition and promotes private capital”. While this is the case to a large extent, the success of the telecommunication leapfrogging exceeds the convenience it offers. The social acceptability of the technology and how appropriately it is infused into the daily lives of adopters is essential to its success story. The leapfrogging discourse must therefore take into account both social and technical changes.

Amid the contentious debate surrounding energy technology leapfrogging and the potentials it presents in Africa’s energy sector, stakeholders must be cautious of risk associated with the radical leaping trajectory, to have the chance of pre-empting the dire repercussions of a ‘messy landing’. Late adopters must look beyond the origin and journey. Destination obliviousness in the context of technology leapfrogging is a recipe for failure. The success or otherwise of leapfrogging late adopters to a new technology is based on the social readiness or suitability of the adopters to use the technology, their economic strength in terms of affordability, the market readiness to make the technology accessible, and the scalability of innovators to streamline the technology and make it adaptable. It is can be good, but looking before leaping is best and strongly advised.


1. Sharif, M.N., 1989. Technological leapfrogging: Implications for developing countries. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 36(1-2), pp.201-208.
2. Alzouma, G., 2005. Myths of digital technology in Africa: Leapfrogging development? Global Media and Communication, 1(3), pp.339-356.
3. Davison, R., Vogel, D., Harris, R. and Jones, N., 2000. Technology leapfrogging in developing countries-an inevitable luxury? The Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries, 1.
4. Amankwah‐Amoah, J., 2015. Solar Energy in Sub‐Saharan Africa: The Challenges and Opportunities of Technological Leapfrogging. Thunderbird International Business Review, 57(1), pp.15-31.

the memory of water

This poem was presented by Paul at the Joint Conference of the International Society of Industrial Ecology and International Symposium of Sustainable Systems and Technology, hosted in Chicago from June 25-29 2017.

the memory of water
(or: cape town’s linear, unsustainable water metabolism and the lack of anticipatory planning which led to crisis)

August 2014

rain falls on the slopes of the berg river catchment
drops coalesce into streams
that meet the theewaterskloof dam
steady. waiting. evaporating

a pump pumps
(with lightning tamed from broken atoms 50 kilometres away)
with grav assist
water moves through harsh environs
of chlorine and lyme.

in darkness enters the city and
split and split and split again
till bright light opens it upon
hands and dishes – in toilet bowls – from showerheads
sprayed across flowering plants and gleaming mercs
from running taps down muddy roads past informal homes
in boilers and engines and cooling contraptions
reshaped and shifted. evapotranspirated

condensed. absorbed -
the lucky become clouds
free float and fly
or sink underground
to feed green crop
or recharge the aquifer.

while the rest, suds and all
reenter the pipes
darkens conveys through solids extraction
anerobic and aerobic trauma
and absorbed by salty surrounds of ocean water
where nutrients bloom
and biodiversity

ecoli wash past blue flag beaches
touching bathing tourists
city patrons who come to cape town
for natures beauty
and may not feel
the memory of water.

March 2017

No rain has fallen on the slopes of the theewaterskloof
and the city –
surprised by events it predicted in 20 oh 6
– calls for all:
reduce your use

so highway signs count down to the
end of water
ignored by urbanites who imagine
water comes only from taps
120 days left
no thought of the panic elicited
when a disgruntled public
see only
20 days left
so the signs much change
pipe pressure is dropped
and government states plainly its policy:
lets pray for precipitation

meanwhile the gardens die
cars lie conscientiously dirty
while the city’s gone from
green to beige
and blame is passed
from citizens to city
from rich to poor
to fire helicopters dumping dam water on an intense fire season
(predicted in 20 oh 6)

June 2016

no rain has fallen on the slopes of the theewaterskloof
though drizzles tickle eyes of
longing capetonians
looking for rain
a perhaps psychological balm to signal the end
of crisis
hopefully not ending the
3 daily toilet flush – the 2 minute shower – the limited laundry
all part of the 100 litre goal per person.
too bad drizzle isn’t drinkable

when the rain arrives
the waves arise
a storm of note
floods the city but
the dam levels rise

this crisis will last
reduce your use
says the mayor
unveils a new planned portfolio
on sustainable views
of how the city will change
and so ensues
that resource efficiency is finally
on the agenda

August 2030

rain falls on the slopes of the theewaterskloof
flows through pipes to the city
meeting water that’s
with the system it moves through
supports. hydrates

now toilet wash holds value
fueling gardens (indigenous)
and busses (electric)
no highway signs needed
as society’s conceded:
reduce your use – we’re water scarce!

our water adventures in circular fashion
now city’s caught-on
that’s a good pattern
expanding its works
water treatment reverts
to send back grey black blue
for an extra purpose

and throughout the system
pipes are lined with messages to keep
the crisis of cape town
in the memory of water

What do we really mean when we talk about energy leapfrogging?

It is now widely known that the sub-Saharan African power sector is at a threshold of significant change. There is growing consensus that the centralised model of electrification through national grid extension is becoming outdated in a techno-economic sense. In fact, the 634 million-large non-electrified population is an account of the inefficiencies inherent in the conventional centralised model. Decentralisation of electricity generation and distribution is now often seen as a viable alternative, which has placed decentralised renewable energy technologies, comprised of stand-alone off-grid systems (primarily solar home systems) and mini-grids in the limelight.

Solar home systems have however gained much more traction than mini-grids over the past few years. This is primarily because of less complexity in deployment and better financial returns on offer. The result is a flood of investments entering the solar home system market, which in turn drives down costs and makes these technologies more accessible for the end user.

However, I am hesitant to rally behind this movement and will be careful of putting solar home systems under the mantra of leapfrogging as is often done. Technology leapfrogging is defined as the “adoption of advanced or state-of-the-art technology in an application area where immediate prior technology has not been adopted.”ii The premise is that industrialising countries can avoid the carbon and resource intensive and wasteful energy development path that industrialised countries went through in setting up their energy infrastructure over the course of the past centuryiii. Solar home systems are commonly described as a leapfrog solution, which implies that by deploying these technologies, industrialising countries can embark on a process of electrification that is carbon neutral, resource efficient and sustainable. This is all true, but the quality of energy services that solar home systems provide to the end user is often overlooked in the leapfrogging discussion.

In my view, the output of solar home systems is not on par with the level required to allow energy poor households to well and truly move out of energy poverty. As Figure 1 shows, average household consumption of electricity in the industrialised (and industrialising) world is well above the approximate output level that solar home systems in the low-income market can provide. Furthermore, early experiences with solar home systems also indicate the aspiration among households to own higher wattage appliances after the initial basic energy needs have been met with solar home systemsiv. That goes to say that solar home systems are very effective in providing access to basic modern energy services, but access to basic modern energy services in the decentralised way as described here does not constitute energy leapfrogging. Instead, it entails a step up the energy ladder. The crux of the matter is that we should be weary of confusing energy leapfrogging with stepping up the energy ladder.

Screen Shot 2017-08-03 at 11.10.13 PM
Figure 1: Output limitations of solar home systems
Source: PowerGen Renewable Energy (2016)i

If we are to bring about energy leapfrogging in Africa, we need a technology that can replace the national grid. Mini-grids, alternatively, can replace the grid because it provides the kind of energy services that are on par with the gridv. By providing grid-quality, alternating current electricity, mini-grids have the potential to well and truly move the energy poor out of energy poverty and in turn socio-economic poverty. It can do this by not only powering all household applications, but also by electrifying productive activities such as welding, milling, food processing, heating and many others. This is what businesses require to be electrified and I believe that this is an antecedent for localised economic development. Further, localised economic development in rural areas can slow down urbanisation because rural inhabitants will perceive more economic opportunity in rural areas.

Finally, energy leapfrogging does not merely entail developing energy infrastructure differently than industrialised nations have done. Granted, by building energy infrastructure with solar home systems, we are avoiding the negative consequences of a carbon and resource intensive fossil fuel-based national grid. However, by doing so, we will not converge with the future energy infrastructure of the world. That is because the future energy infrastructure consistently points to the development of smart grids powered by renewable energy and we will not be able to achieve this with solar home systems.

Screen Shot 2017-07-31 at 1.25.34 PM
Figure 2: Threat of not converging with the future power infrastructure
Source: iPowerGen Renewable Energy (2016)

I believe that we should avoid short term solutions such as a small incremental step up the energy service ladder and instead adopt a long-term vision of building the energy infrastructure of the future in sub-Saharan Africa and in turn well and truly move our population out of energy- and socio-economic poverty. It is my view that AC mini-grids will be our best option for achieving this vision.

i PowerGen Renewable Energy. 2016. The Future of Power in Africa: How Africa can Lead the Next Generation of Global Power Infrastructure. Nairobi: PowerGen Renewable Energy.
ii Fong, M.W.L. 2009. Technology Leapfrogging for Developing Countries, in Khosrow-Pour, M. (ed.). Encyclopaedia of Information Science and Technology. Hershey: IGI Global.
iii Goldemberg, J. 2011. Technological Leapfrogging in the Developing World. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 12(1):135-141.
iv Lee, K., Miguel, E. & Wolfram, C. 2016. Appliance Ownership and Aspirations among Electric Grid and Home Solar Households in Rural Kenya. American Economic Review, 106(5):89-94.
v Knucles, J. 2016. Business models for mini-grid electricity in base of pyramid markets. Energy for Sustainable Development, 31(1):67-82.